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NOTES
Genetic Discrimination in Health Insurance
I. INTRODUCTION
Why should we allow someone to benefit from their genetic endowment to the
detriment of those less fortunate than themselves? Persons with detrimentally aberrant
genomes should not be subject to medical insurance discrimination made possible by
genetic research funded by the public. Such research is conducted for the purpose of
advancing science and human well being, not the perfection of insurance underwriting.
Why should we sacrifice the potential medically beneficial fruits of society's invest-
ments in genetic research so that private insurance companies, which were profitable
before humanity had the means to genetically predict an individual's medical future,
might offer the lowest possible insurance rates to a handful of genetically "superior"
individuals?
In the late 1980's, biology and technology had advanced to the point where ge-
netic maps could be calculated.' With maps of the human genome, scientists could
begin to decipher which genes, when altered, resulted in specific diseases present in
the human population. Scientists realized that if the source and process of genetic
diseases could be discerned, appropriate therapies for the afflicted might be developed,
freeing afflicted individual, from the consequences of their conditions, and allowing
them to return as productive, healthy members of society.
Recognizing the potential benefits of a complete map of the human genome, an
international team of more than one hundred scientists in government, university and
commercial laboratories have labored collectively in an effort termed the Human Ge-
nome Project.2 To accomplish its share of the work needed, in 1989 the United States
established the National Center for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) under the
National Institutes of Health, which was renamed the National Human Genome Re-
search Institute in 1997.' The NCHGR funded research facilities throughout the coun-
try and established the Division of Intramural Research to apply genetic findings to-
ward diagnosis and treatment of genetic diseases and acquired genetic disorders.4
So far, disorders and diseases which can be predicted or identified with genetic
tests have been relatively rare.' The advent of tests for some genetic forms of breast
1. Genetic linkage maps give the position of genes on a chromosome. The location of each indi-
vidual gene is referred to as a loci. The distance between loci determine the likelihood or possibility
of two different genes being inherited together (referred to as linked genes) or separately following
cross-over of the inherited chromosomes of each parent.
2. National Human Genome Research Institute (visited Jan. 4, 1998) <http://www.aamc.org/re-
search/adhocgr/ncgr.htm>.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Sheryl Stolberg, Insurance Falls Prey To Genetic Bias; The DNA Revolution is a Blessing
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and colon cancer, combined with the continued development of other genetic tests by
the Human Genome Project, however, means that genetic information's use, or misuse,
will affect greater numbers of individuals as genetic knowledge expands.
Debates have raged over who should have use of information gleaned from our
genes by genetic research which will impact our potential medical fates. Should the
inescapable, and now soon to be unconcealable, content of our genes be a private
matter confined to the realm of a doctor-patient relationship, or should such informa-
tion be publicly accessible to entities like health insurers for use in medical underwrit-
ing?
Access to the results of genetic testing would provide insurance companies with
the information required to form three new categories of individuals in their underwrit-
ing schemes. One category would consist of asymptomatic individuals who stand a
substantial probability of acquring aul,c, s. d, oh.i1;t;,s from conditions like
Huntington's disease, myotonic dystrophy, and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.6 A sec-
ond category would also consist of asymptomatic individuals, but they would merely
be predisposed, not certain, to develop diseases like heart disease, diabetes, some can-
cers, and mental disorders.7 The third new category of potential insurees would consist
of those who would never themselves become ill, but who are carriers of genes that
could affect the health of any children they might have.'
The answer to who will pay what for whom in the area of health care must
address how each of these categories of individuals' interests weigh against the inter-
ests of insurers and the rest of society. The question of who will pay has been ad-
dressed under state and federal law, as well as in political and ethical theory. To date,
however, no legislation seems to have satisfactorily balanced the interests of individu-
als, economics and ethics.
and a Curse. It Tells Some the Potential for Disease, but Allows Companies to Deny Coverage. Some
Fear This Is Only the Beginning of a Huge Dilemma., L.A. TIMES HOME EDITION, Mar. 27, 1994, at
Al: Column 1; Metro Desk (stating that the following genetic disorders and diseases can currently be
genetically tested for. 1. Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease)-a degenerative disease of
the nervous system, 2. Deta-thalassemia which is prevalent in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and
Southeast Asia-causes a breakup of the red blood cells, leading to anemia, spleen enlargement and
sometimes abnormal growth of bones (fatal in early childhood if left untreated), 3. Charcot Marie-
Tooth disease-causes abnormalities in the feet and hands, 4. Cystic Fibrosis-the most common lethal
genetic defect, causing chronic lung infections and an inability to absorb fats and other nutrients, 5.
Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy-the major form of muscular dystrophy in children. It causes progressive
degeneration of the muscle fibers, 6. Fragile X Syndrome-a chromosomal disorder causing mental im-
pairment, ranging from subtle learning disabilities to severe retardation and autism. Symptoms are gen-
erally more pronounced in boys, 7. Gaucher's disease-a disorder common to Ashkenazi Jews. The most
severe form appears in infancy, causing central nervous system impairment and death within the first
year, 8. Huntington's disease-a degenerative brain disorder, 9. Marfan Syndrome-a disease of the con-
nective tissue that often strikes athletes, 10. Myotonic Dystrophy-Most common form of muscular dys-
trophy in adults. 11. Retinoblastoma-an inherited form of eye tumors in children. 12. Tay-Sachs dis-
ease-a brain disorder common among Ashkenazi Jews which results in death during early childhood).
6. Adrienne Asch, Genetics and Employment, More Disability Discrimination, in THE HuMAN
GENOME PRoJECT AND THE FuruRE OF HEALTH CAtE 158, 161 (Thomas H. Murray et al. eds., 1996).
7. Id.
8. Id. Genetic disorders such as hemophilia, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, sickle cell anemia,
cystic fibrosis and Tay Sachs require the inheritance of the defective gene from both parents. Receipt
of only one deleterious copy of the gene makes one a "carrier" of the condition, unaffected by the
condition but capable of passing the disease on to offspring if one's mate is also a carrier who also
passes on the deleterious gene. Id.
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This Note focuses on the justice of allowing genetic discrimination by medical
insurers. It will provide a brief overview of some philosophical frameworks from
which the issue of genetic discrimination can be studied before it explains why such
discrimination should not be allowed. Legislative attempts to protect individuals from
genetic discrimination in past acts and present bills will then be reviewed to demon-
strate their inadequacies. Finally, it will conclude with some suggestions of legislation
which would provide more meaningful protection against genetic discrimination than
recent acts and bills have afforded.
H. PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORKS
It has been generally held that only two ethical theories provide plausible means
to systematically arrive at a moral judgement in any given circumstance.9 These two
theories are Utilitarianism and Rawls' Theory of Justice.
Utilitarianism is an eighteenth century tradition best represented by the writings
of two English philosophers, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill."° The classical
form of Utilitarianism is a doctrine of hedonism, where action is deemed to be ethical
if it tends to promote greater happiness in society than any alternative actions will."
Newer forms of the doctrine include economically based Preference Utilitarianism
which regards anything of economic value as a rational goal one can ethically seek,
and Negative Utilitarianism which regards behavior that avoids disutility as ethical. 2
The main argument against the use of any form of Utilitarianism as an ethical
doctrine is its compatibility with a practice of sacrificing individuals so long as more
members of society would benefit from such an act than suffer. 3 As Mill himself
admitted, the inability to provide desirable results with regard to cherished concepts
like justice was Utilitarianism's greatest failure. 4
In 1971, John Rawls' Theory of Justice was enthusiastically welcomed as an
ethical theory that was just as plausible, systematic, and universally applicable as Utili-
tarianism, and yet adequately accounted for values such as justice. 5 Rather than the
hedonistic goal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, Rawls asserted that
ethical decisions 'within a society ought to be based upon principles its individual
members would have agreed upon if they did not know what their particular position
in society would be. 6 Rawls referred to this state as behind a veil of ignorance.
From behind the veil of ignorance, Rawls claimed individuals would not seek to
maximize utility, but instead would seek to provide safeguards against too severe of an
existence. He predicted that they would provide for the maximum amount of personal
liberty that could coexist with a distribution of wealth which would make the least
well-off members of society as well-off as possible. 7
9. Ethics, 18 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 515 (15th ed. 1994).
10. See generally Philosophical Schools and Doctrines-Western-Utilitarianism, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRrrANNICA 219 (15th ed. 1994).
11. This classical form is referred to as Ileal Utilitarianism.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See supra note 9.
14. See supra note 10.
15. See supra note 9.
16. See JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTICE 136-142 (1971).
17. This principle is Rawls' maximin principle in that the welfare of the worst-off members of
society would be maximized. See supra note 9.
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However, Rawls did not believe that his theory advocated socialism. This is
evident in "that if we accept certain assumptions about the effect of incentives and the
benefits that may flow to all from the productive labours of the most talented members
of society, the maximin principle could allow considerable inequality."'"
Rawls' Theory of Justice, rather than variants of Utilitarianism, is the more ap-
propriate philosophical framework from which to consider the ethical nature of allow-
ing health insurance discrimination through the use of genetic information in our soci-
ety. Since the 1935 passage of the Social Security Act and the advent of the welfare
state, 9 our society has not had a utilitarian orientation. Rather, our society claims to
seek liberty and justice for all, goals which can only be supported with Rawls' theo-
ries.
III. WHY GENETIC DISCRIMINATION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED
Prior to the advent of predictive genetic capabilities, created in part by the efforts
of the Human Genome Project and other genetic research, the manner in which medi-
cal insurers handled treatments for genetic diseases mirrored the veil of ignorance
envisioned in Rawls' Theory of Justice. No one had any means of ensuring that they,
or their offspring, would not fall victim to one of the conditions or diseases we now
know are the result of deleterious genetic mutations. Medical care for these conditions
was not exempted from coverage by insurance policies at that time; nor, absent knowl-
edge as to one's risks of falling victim to such a disease, was it likely that people
would clamor for such exemption. Following the advent of predictive genetic technolo-
gy, armed with the ability to know that they will not be struck with genetic based dis-
ease X, some individuals seek to avoid paying the price of insuring those, who tech-
nology can now discern will or might suffer the ravages of genetic diseases."
Indeed, "some insurers argue that it is actuarially unfair, and therefore morally
unfair, to those at low medical risk when insurers do not exclude those at high risk
from insurance pools."'" With Rawls' veil of ignorance lifted, many individuals, like
the health insurance companies, claim that they should be allowed to benefit from the
good fortune of their genetic endowment, much as an individual is allowed to benefit
from being smarter than another, more athletic than another, etc.
But, what frequently goes unrecognized by proponents of such arguments is that
society already limits the use of some forms of advantage with which those individuals
are born. For example, society does not recognize any legitimate advantages or disad-
18. Id.
19. The welfare state includes such innovations as aid to physically and mentally handicapped in-
dividuals, unemployment benefits, and minimum-wage laws, all of which are based on principles of
justice, not utilitarianism.
20. Insurance rates are set by a process referred to as underwriting. Underwriting is the actuarial
process of determining what expenses a given pool of potential insurees will incur in medical expenses
over the life of their policy and setting a sufficiently high rate for medical insurance coverage to en-
sure sufficient funds to cover expenses and still allow for a profit by the insurance company. If one
were able to guarantee that a given population would not be subject to conditions which are expensive
to treat medically, that group could safely be offered lower rates than the identical population absent
such guarantees. Some genetically fit individuals claim that they should be allowed to form insurance
pools which exclude genetically defective individuals so that they might reap the personal benefits of
lowered insurance rates.
21. Norman Daniels, The Human Genome Project and the Distribution of Scarce Medical Resourc-
es, in THE HUMAN GENoME PROJECT AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 173, 179 (Thomas H.
Murray, et al. eds., 1996).
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vantages in the distribution of opportunities and rights on'the basis of sex or race
despite the market advantages and disadvantages people frequently infer to them.
Why should we allow some to benefit from their genetic endowment any more
than we permit them to benefit from having been born black or white, male or female?
All of these traits are obtained simply by the luck of the draw, require no cultivation to
develop and maintain, and merit no special recognition or privileges. Intelligence or
sports ability, which benefit their possessors, require some degree of effort or cultiva-
tion on the part of the individual gifted with them. Genetics, race, and sex do not merit
the recognition we allow intelligence, sports ability, and other talents in determining
the legitimate assets an individual may use in furthering their interests. "Even among
those philosophers who want to treat talents and skills as individual assets, only the
strictest libertarians treat health status differences merely as 'unfortunate' variations
and believe that there is no social obligation to correct for the relative advantages and
disadvantages caused by disease or disability.' 22
Clearly it is unethical for health insurers to discriminate based upon the genetic
status of its clients. Various governmental entities have also come to this conclusion as
well.
IV. WHY WE NEED LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF GENETICS-BASED
MEDICAL INSURANCE DISCRIMINATION
In 1993, Dr. Paul Billings 23 had already found ninety-three cases of so-called
genetic health insurance discrimination, even though scientists had only identified two
percent of the human genome by this time.24 By 1994, horror stories had seeped into
popular news sources such as the L.A. Times story about an entire New Hampshire
family who lost their health insurance because their eight-year-old was diagnosed with
the genetic disorder called Fragile X Syndrome,' despite the fact that the remaining
members of the family were unaffected by the disease. In desperation, the family con-
tacted the "state's assistant insurance commissioner, a disability rights lawyer and a
U.S. [S]enator... all of whom said it was the insurers' right" to cancel their cover-
age. 26 This family did not need anyone to tell them that genetic information can ad-
versely affect not only the afflicted individual, but can also be used to prevent unaf-
fected parents, siblings, cousins, and future offspring from acquiring reasonable health
insurance.
The potential for genetic discrimination by health insurance companies was rec-
ognized as early as May 10, 1993, by the NCHGR. The NCHGR suggested a need for
health insurers to place a "[mioratorium on the use of genetic tests in underwriting
until a program of universal basic health services is in place."27 The NCHGR believed
at that time that a combination of self-regulation and federal legislation would resolve
22. Id. at 183.
23. Dr. Billings is a clinical geneticist in Palo Alto, California.
24. Interview by Greg Lefevre with the child of a Huntington's Patient, on Your Money [CNN
television broadcast, Jan. 23, 1993] (Jan. 23, 1993).
25. Fragile X Syndrome is a genetic disorder which impairs an individual's mental development,
but is not considered a genetic disease. Rather it is referred to as a developmental disorder.
26. Stolberg, supra note 5, at 1.
27. Health Insurers Should Impose "Moratorium" on Use of Genetic Tests in Underwriting -
Task Force, BLUE SHEET (F-D-C Reports, Inc., Washington, D.C.), May 12, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Health Library, MEDJNL File.
1998]
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unethical discrimination in the health insurance industry resulting from advances in
genetic knowledge through the Human Genome Project. Unfortunately, it was evident
by stories like that carried in the L.A. Times that self-regulation by the insurance in-
dustry was already insufficient to protect insurees from discrimination in 1994.
This lack of protection for genetically defective individuals remained an unre-
solved problem in 1997. During this span of time, state and federal legislatures have
attempted to introduce legislation which would prevent discrimination against the ge-
netically flawed by insurance companies, but to date none of the enacted legislation
seems to have successfully ended genetic discrimination.
V. STATE LEGISLATION ENACTED TO PREVENT
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
By 1994, Ohio and Caifornia and New York were
drafting, laws to prohibit insurers from using genetic information to deny individuals
health insurance coverage." The Wisconsin law,29 for example, prohibited insurers
from: (a) requiring or requesting an individual or family member to obtain a genetic
test; (b) requiring or requesting directly or indirectly into the results of a genetic test;
(c) conditioning the provision of insurance coverage or benefits on genetic testing; or
(d) considering genetic testing in the determination of rates or any other aspect of
insurance coverage or health care benefits provided to an individual whether an indi-
vidual or a member of the individual's family has obtained a genetic test or what the
results of the test, if obtained by the individual or a member of the individual's family,
were.3
Wisconsin's legislation failed to state how these regulations would be policed, or
how the enforcement would be funded. Enacted state laws "focus[ed] narrowly on
genetic tests, rather than more broadly on genetic information generated by family
history, physical examination or the medical record."'3' Although state laws can and
do prohibit using "the results of a chemical test of DNA or the protein product of a
gene," insurers "may still use other physical/physiological (phenotype) indicators,
patterns of inheritance of genetic characteristics, or even a request for genetic testing
as the basis for discrimination.' 32 These problems, however, cannot be solved merely
by expansively defining genetic information in state legislation due to the federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) laws.
While concerning an employee with AIDS, not a genetic disease, McGann v. H
& H Music Co. 33 demonstrated "how state based prohibitions on genetic underwriting
will be undermined.13' After McGann had made his first claims under his employer's
28. Stolberg, supra note 5, at 1.
29. Wis. STAT. § 631.89 (1995).
30. Wis. STAT. § 631.89(2)(a)-(d) (1995).
31. Prepared Testimony of Karen H. Rothenberg J.D., M.P.A., Marjorie Cook Professor of Law,
Director Law & Health Care Program University of Maryland School of Law, Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 104th Cong. (1996).
32. Id.
33. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (giving ERISA employers the
right to change their self-insured benefit plans through ERISA).
34. Deborah A. Stone, The Implications of the Human Genome Project for Access to Health In-
surance, in THE HUMAN GENOME PRoJEcr AND THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE 133, 149 (Thomas H.
Murray et al. eds., 1996).
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health insurance plan, the employer switched its commercial insurer to a self-insured
plan.3" The employer then capped coverage under this new plan for AIDS treatment at
five thousand dollars, but allowed a one million dollar maximum for all other claims
for medical care. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that it was an:
employer's right to change its self-insured benefit plan in response to diseases or
expenses incurred by a single employee. [footnote omitted] Of course, an employer
might do the same thing for any other disease. No. doubt it would be harder for an
employer to cap benefits for relatively common diseases that afflict many employ-
ees and dependents, such as cancer or heart disease. But, like AIDS, genetic diseas-
es tend to be less common and thus easier and more likely targets for employers
looking for ways to cut the costs of their fringe benefits.'
Thus, according to McGann, "[u]nder the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), employers who self-insure are exempt from state insurance regulations (both
statutory and regulatory).""a Since a "large proportion of the population receives
health benefits from self-funded plans not subject to state insurance laws,38
protections against discrimination based on state legislation are unenforceable to consti-
tute a solution to problems with genetic discrimination due to ERISA. Insurers, in
concert with employers, in an attempt to limit their expenses in either premiums or
disbursements, could and, no doubt would, in order to remain competitive, use ERISA
to step around any state legislation regulating insurance use of genetic information.
VI. CONGRESSIONAL ACTS USED TO LIMIT
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 199039 (ADA) was not enacted with the
specific intent of preventing health insurance discrimination. It was created in part to
prevent a phenomenon referred to as job-lock,4° which resulted in the onset of medi-
cally expensive disabilities. The ability to diagnosis latent genetic diseases resulted in a
source of job-lock, which while not considered upon the ADA's enactment, created a
need to expand the breadth of antidiscriminatory protection, which the ADA provided
to employees. Some proponents of the ADA believed that this legislation would relieve
workers from being locked to their jobs because of dependence upon a health insur-
ance policy without which they could not financially survive when they or a dependent
became disabled. Unfortunately, this legislation was not far-reaching enough to provide
the relief its proponents sought.
The first problem with using ADA to combat genetic discrimination in obtaining
employment with sufficient health insurance is that it does not apply to all employers.
Beginning in July 1992, public and private sector employers of twenty-five or more
employees were forbidden to discriminate based upon disabilities of potential employ-
35. Companies which self-insure their health care policies are those that only bear the cost of any
claims incurred as a result of an employee's or dependent's medical expenses.
36. Stone, supra note 34, at 148.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Rothenberg, supra note 31.
39. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1995).
40. Job-lock is the position an employee faces when the employee's medical benefits, especially
related to preexisting conditions coverage, does not transfer to a subsequent employer's benefit plan.
Consequently, the employee is discouraged from seeking new employment for fear of losing these
medical benefits and is locked into her current job.
1998]
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ees.41 On July 26, 1995, these restrictions extended to all employers with fifteen or
more employees. However, vast numbers of individuals working for small employers
are exempted from coverage by the ADA's protections.
Furthermore, complaints under the ADA against limitations of fringe benefits like
health insurance, are also similar to those of state legislation combating health insur-
ance discrimination when suits were brought against companies using self-insured
plans. As was seen in McGann, ERISA would once again be used to protect an
employer's right to limit coverage based on inordinate medical expenses incurred by a
few individuals who would endanger the fiscal solvency of the company, if they were
to be included in that company's self-funded insurance plan.
The ADA is too simplistic in its scope to sufficiently protect people from health
insurance discrimination by health insurers. Since the ADA addresses only employ-
er/employee relations, it seemed to only address prevention of disability discrimination
by employers. It did not seem to stop insurance companies from using the infamous
preexisting condition clauses in health insurance policies. Sufferers of genetic defects
or workers whose dependents have genetic defects are still locked to the jobs they had
when they, or their dependents were first diagnosed with a costly or potentially fman-
cially devastating disease or disability.
Attempts were made to reform the ADA regulations of insurance companies, but
these attempts have been minimally effective. "Some people have argued that the
insurance company is a public entity and thus should be covered under the full pro-
visions" of the ADA, "[b]ut there is other language in the ADA that says that insur-
ance practices which conform to state principles-and most of the state principles talk
about actuarial fairness-would be exempted on that basis."42
At first glance this backdoor out of the ADA's regulatory powers over insurance
companies might appear to be poor drafting, but it was actually a necessary evil. The
logic behind such a provision in the ADA is that "if there's an actuarial basis for [in-
surance discrimination], it's okay. All insurance is discrimination of one sort or anoth-
er. The question is, is it legal or not?"'43 Thus, if the discrimination falls within actuar-
ial fairness as defined under state law, it is not actionable under the ADA, whether
ethical or not.
VII. CONGRESSIONAL BILLS INTENDED TO END
GENETIC DISCRIMINATION
The ADA's failure to prevent genetic discrimination as a result of ERISA's
protections and the ADA's own actuarial fairness clause has led to the introduction of
many bills in Congress. Some of the most recent congressional bills aimed at ceasing
genetic discrimination by health insurers included: the Genetic Information Health
Insurance Nondiscrimination Act of 1997" (GIHINA) sponsored by Representative
Gerald B. Solomon (R-NY), the Genetic Privacy and Nondiscrimination Act of 1997'5
(GPNA) sponsored by Representative Clifford B. Stearns (R-FL), the Genetic Informa-
41. ERIc RANDALL, NYPER ADA UPDATE, ADA-TnE FIRST FIVE YEARS (Mar. 1995).
42. Reginald Rhein, Federal Disability Law Bans Genetic Discrimination, BIOTECHNOLOGY
NEWSWATCH, May 1, 1995, at 1.
43. Id.
44. H.R. 328, 105th Cong. (1997).
45. H.R. 341, 105th Cong. (1997).
[Vol. 24:237
1998] Genetic Discrimination 245
tion Nondiscrimination in Health Insurance Act of 1997' (GINHIA) sponsored by
Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME), and the Genetic Confidentiality and Nondiscrimi-
nation Act of 199747 (GCNA) sponsored by Senator Pete V. Domenici (R-NM). Each
of these bills insightfully recognized elements that will need to be enacted into law if
an end to genetic discrimination in the health insurance industry is to be obtained.
The greatest insight of the GIHINA was recognizing the need to forbid health
insurance discrimination based upon requested or received genetic information or ge-
netic test results. This provision is key toward stopping genetic discrimination in health
insurance, because most information used by insurance companies in their medical
underwriting is not surreptitiously obtained in violation of a person's privacy. Rather, it
is gained through the answering of questions posed, and the release of medical records
by the potential insuree to the insurance company in the insurance application, along
with permission to obtain the potential insuree's record from the Medical Information
Bureau (MIB).
The MIB "is an insurance industry-run data bank, accessible to nearly 800 mem-
ber companies in the United States and Canada."' The member insurance companies
input any relevant data they obtain from an individual, and all members have access to
the information. As a result, when they seek health insurance, consumers find them-
selves facing an omniscient entity that knows, at minimum, all medical procedures and
tests ever performed on them and paid for by a health insurer.
Complete cooperation on the part of the applicants in releasing their MIB re-
cords, and answering the applications' medical history questions, is induced by the
inclusion of full disclosure guarantee clauses which render the insurance, if granted,
invalid in the event that the applicants were not fully forthcoming in disclosures on
their applications.
The release of medical records will often reveal what the applicants either do not
consciously know or will not acknowledge about their genetic endowment. The release
often includes such diverse sources as "physicians, other medical practitioners, hospi-
tals, clinics, other medical facilities, insurance companies, and sometimes employ-
ers.... [and at times any] organization, institution, or person that has any records or
knowledge"'49 of the applicants' health.
Privacy is not technically violated by this process because the applicants sign
away their rights. Arguments that privacy legislation could at least guarantee the rights
of applicants to be informed as to how this information could potentially be used
against them would be an empty right, given that there would be few or no other op-
tions than the release of medical records and medical histories if one desired to obtain
health insurance. No competitive private market exists within the insurance industry
because what the potential consumer actually faces is a "monopolist seller in the sense
that insurers can choose their customers, and virtually all insurers have access to the
same information about a potential customer,"'5 thanks to the MIB.
Laws limiting an insurer's ability to perform genetic tests, or obtain results of
tests which were performed on those seeking health insurance, are irrelevant to the
46. S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997).
47. S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997).
48. Stone, supra note 34, at 143.
49. Id. at 141.
50. Id. at 143.
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accessibility of health coverage because these companies "dg and will have virtually
unlimited access to the information from genetic tests performed in the medical
sphere."'" Provisions in the GIHINA,52 forbidding discrimination based upon the re-
quest or receipt of genetic information or test results, are therefore necessary if further
progress is to be made in combating genetic discrimination in health insurance.
The greatest contribution of the GPNA was its forward-looking provision direct-
ing the National Bioethics Advisory Commission to report to Congress its recommen-
dations on providing protection for collecting, storing, and using genetic samples and
data.13 Provision like these will help ensure that future research on the Human Ge-
nome Project will not be precluded or unduly burdened by congressional efforts to pre-
vent injuries from the data we have already extrapolated from our genes.
The GINHIIA reminds us that it is not enough to merely regulate the insurance
industry to end gcnetic d.scrimination Regulation is usually only effective if it is cou-
pled with sufficient punishment to induce compliance by the regulated industry. This
Act suggests providing for compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages for
violations of suggested amendments to ERISA, the Public Health Service Act, Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act, or the Internal Revenue Code, in order to eradicate
genetic discrimination by the health insurance industry.54
The GCNA not only seeks to protect against unconsented disclosure of genetic
information, but also regulates redisclosure of information which may have originally
been legitimately received.5 Such provisions should help to prevent the continued
existence of the MIB which places the consumer of health insurance at a disadvantage
when dealing with a health insurance company.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Genetic disease is not the fault of the individuals who suffer under its ailment.
Prior to the identification of strange disorders and ailments which are being the result
of genetic defect, many victims might have found coverage for their medical treatment
from their ordinary health care coverage through an insurance company or their em-
ployer.
As our medical knowledge grew, thanks in part to government-funded research
on genetics, additional legislation to protect individuals from high-rate discrimination,
or the inability to gain medical insurance at all, was needed due to our newfound
knowledge regarding the origins of such ailments. As we acquired more knowledge
regarding inheritable traits, the list of individuals who needed protection also grew
because the insurance industry actively avoided liability in covering afflicted individu-
als. While it may be natural for insurance companies to avoid covering individuals
with genetic disease, they cannot ethically be allowed to shirk from such serious health
policy issues.
The ADA is inadequate in its protection of people with genetic diseases and
disorders, because by definition the insurance industry must use some degree of dis-
crimination if they are to be allowed to use the underwriting techniques on which they
51. Id. at 134-35.
52. H.R. 328, 105th Cong. (1997).
53. H.R. 341, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997).
54. S. 89, 105th Cong. (1997).
55. S. 422, 105th Cong. (1997).
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were originally founded as a means of risk management for their consumers. The
reason that some might find such an argument distasteful is that many individuals in
our society today do not deem health insurance to be a means of risk management, but
* rather a means of obtaining the bodily integrity to make the most of their lives and
participate equally within society. The ADA serves many purposes successfully, but
protecting the genetically defective from an inability to gain health insurance is not one
of them.
Privacy laws in theory would be a good idea as well to protect society from
genetic discrimination by health insurers. People should be informed that insurance
companies are not like a collection of individual agents competitively seeking business
as a highly organized institution seeking collective protection of their respective com-
petitive edges. But privacy laws are insufficient protection as well, since mere rights
can easily be contracted away when one is not as powerful or worldly as the entity
with which one contracts.
If we are to end genetic discrimination without foreclosing future progress in
genetic research, we must enact a bill which encompasses at least all of the solutions
outlined in the four bills cited. This new bill includes forbidding the use of any genetic
information, or information from which genetic conclusions could be formulated, from
being used in medical underwriting, regardless of its being obtained upon request or
mere innocent receipt. We also must provide for punishments within such a bill to
induce compliance with its provisions. We will have to ensure at the same time, how-
ever, that future genetic research will not be precluded or unduly restricted by the
protections we grant individuals' genetic endowments. Finally, we must find a means
to prevent the dissemination of genetic information received legitimately by one entity
to others who were not originally authorized to receive such data. Only then will we
have solved the vexing phenomenon of genetic discrimination.
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